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3 
IS “VITAL MOTION” A HALAKHIC CONCEPT? 
Ira Bedzow, Noam Stadlan, John Loike* 
Abstract: In this article, the authors analyze the Talmudic and 
halakhic sources upon which the concept of “vital motion” is based so 
as to evaluate whether the sources support the concept.  Through this 
analysis, the authors present the view that vital and non-vital motion 
are not distinct halakhic categories.  Rather, physical or physiological 
activity is understood in context as either meaningful or not, depending 
on whether it is assumed that the person or animal will continue living 
or not. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the Jewish tradition, the main definition of life is ensoulment 
or possessing the spirit of life (nishmat ruach).1  Death, therefore, is 
defined as occurring when the soul or life force (nefesh) leaves the 
body.  Examples of this definition being used even in a juridical sense 
can be found in two different passages in the Mishna.  In the first 
passage, the Mishna states, “He who closes the eyes of a yetziat nefesh 
[a person whose soul is departing] is a spiller of blood.”2  In the second 
passage, the Mishna states, “A person does not defile [as a corpse] until 
his soul departs.”3  However, because a person’s soul or life force is a 
spiritual entity, its departure cannot be empirically observed or 
 
* Ira Bedzow is an associate professor of medicine, the director of the Biomedical Ethics and 
Humanities Program, and head of the UNESCO Chair in Bioethics at New York Medical 
College.  Noam Stadlan is Vice-Chairman of the Department of Neurosurgery at NorthShore 
University Healthcare system, and Assistant Professor, Division of Neurosurgery at the 
Pritzker School of Medicine, University of Chicago. He has recently completed a Masters of 
Science in Bioethics at New York Medical College.  John D. Loike is a professor of biology 
at Touro College and University Systems and writes a regular column on bioethics for The 
Scientist. 
1 See Genesis 7:22, BT Yoma 85a.   
2 Mishna Shabbat 23:5.   
3 Mishna Ohalot 1:6. 
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clinically assessed.4  Therefore, halakhic decisors had to determine 
how they might be able to draw the demarcation line between life and 
death based on physical and/or physiological conditions,5 since “a 
judge has only what his eyes see.”6 
The difficulty with relying on physical conditions to determine 
metaphysical events is demonstrated in the following Talmudic 
example:  The Mishna states, “If a zav, a zava, a niddah, or a woman 
after childbirth has died, they still impart impurity to objects on which 
they are lying or upon which they are riding until their flesh has 
decayed.”7  The Talmud expands on this Mishna to explain the 
impurity to which the Mishna refers is not the impurity of a corpse.  
Rather, it is the ritual impurity, unique to a zav(a) and a menstruating 
woman, where if they sit on an item, even one that cannot become 
ritually impure, and beneath that item is a vessel, the vessel becomes 
ritually impure through their sitting on the item above it.  The 
implication is that, for the sake of this form of ritual impurity, these 
three types of people are considered to still be alive until their flesh 
decays.  The reason for this is due to the fear that the person might 
simply have fainted, and be mistakenly taken for dead.8  Yet, if the 
person’s flesh has started to decay, then it is clear that they are in fact 
dead.9  Rabbi Moshe Sofer explains that the sages instituted this decree 
because the sages understood that people can only recognize that death 
has occurred given their expertise in identifying signs that a person’s 
physical constitution has changed.  For those who are inexperienced in 
detecting signs of life, physical decomposition was the best indication 
they had to recognize that the person had died.  For those who are more 
experienced, other signs could be relied upon, such as a heartbeat and 
respiration. 
 
4 See Bleich, J. David, Establishing Criteria of Death, in TRADITION: A JOURNAL OF 
ORTHODOX JEWISH THOUGHT 90-113 (vol. 13.3) (1973) (“The traditional view is that death 
occurs upon the separation of the soul from the body.  Of course, the occurrence of this 
phenomenon does not lend itself to direct empirical observation.”). 
5 The terms, physical and physiological, both refer to bodies; however, physical refers 
to the body itself while physiological refers to the body’s functions.  
6 BT Bava Batra 131a. 
7 Mishna Niddah 10:4. 
8 Id.  See the alternative position of Rabbi Eliezer in the Talmud, who states that these 
people impart ritual impurity only until the belly of the corpse bursts.  The former position 
only applies in cases where the corpse resembles a person who has fainted.  In other words, 
once the corpse is clearly no longer alive, it no longer imparts this type of ritual impurity. 
9  Resp. Hatam Sofer, YD, no. 338. 
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Currently, debate among halakhic decisors regarding what 
signifies death based on physical and/or physiological conditions has 
become entrenched between two main positions.  One position holds 
that irreversible termination of respiration is a definitive signifier that 
a person has died, and this can be determined by neurological criteria.10  
The other position holds that irreversible termination of cardiac 
activity, or irreversible cessation of vital motion, is the definitive 
signifier that a person has died.11  In this article, we will examine the 
Talmudic and halakhic sources upon which the concept of “vital 
motion” is based so as to evaluate whether the sources support this 
concept.  This evaluation does not appraise the scientific or 
philosophical notion of vital motion; rather, it only tests whether it has 
juridical warrant according to the authoritative sources of Jewish law.  
Through this analysis, we intend to show that vital and non-vital 
motion are not distinct halakhic categories.  Rather, physical or 
physiological activity is understood in context as either meaningful or 
not, depending on whether it is assumed that the person or animal will 
continue living or not. 
II. DEFINITION/DESCRIPTION OF VITAL AND NON-VITAL 
MOTION  
A major proponent of defining the presence of life through the 
presence of “vital motion,” is Rabbi J. David Bleich.  Rabbi Bleich 
writes, “[I]t is not the mere presence of the heart or the function of the 
heart as a unique organ which is the essential indicator of life, but 
rather the ‘movement’ of the heart as a form of integrated, vital 
movement of the organism which indicates that life is present…”12  
Rabbi Bleich derives his notion of “vital motion,” and therefore his 
concept of non-vital motion which he identifies as pirkus, from his 
 
10 This is the position of the Israeli Chief Rabbinate, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, and R. Gedalia 
Dov Schwartz among others. 
11 This is the position of Rabbi J. David Bleich, Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, Rabbi 
Yitzhak Yaakov Weiss, Rabbi Shmuel ha-Levi Wosner, and Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg among 
others.  However, Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Aurbach held that if every cell in the brain were 
definitively dead, the patient should be considered dead. 
12 J. David Bleich & Arthur J. Jacobson, JEWISH LAW AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES, 308 
(2015). 
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understanding of the Mishna in Ohalot 1:6 and of the commentary of 
Rabbi Shlomo Yitzchaki (Rashi)13 in BT Yoma (85a).    
The Mishna in Ohalot states:  
A person does not defile [as a corpse] until his soul 
departs.  Even if he is cut up or even if he is about to 
die, he [still] makes levirate marriage obligatory and 
exempts from levirate marriage, he feeds [his mother] 
terumah and disqualifies [his mother] from eating 
terumah.  Similarly, in the case of cattle or wild 
animals, they do not defile until their souls depart.  If 
their heads have been cut off, even though they are 
moving convulsively (mefarksim), they are unclean, 
like a lizard’s tail which moves convulsively 
(mefarkeset)14   
According to Rabbi Bleich, the Mishna in Ohalot distinguishes 
between two types of movement, namely, movement that indicates life, 
i.e. vital motion, and that which does not, i.e. pirkus.  Convulsive 
movement, or pirkus, is that type of bodily movement that occurs after 
decapitation.  Such movement cannot be indicative of life, since the 
Mishna states that the decapitated animal is unclean, which by 
definition implies that it is considered dead.  However, by mentioning 
that pirkus is not indicative of life, Rabbi Bleich infers that there must 
be another category of movement that does indicate continued life.  He 
writes:  
It is evident that the Mishnah seeks to differentiate 
between two types of movement; movement which is 
devoid of vital significance, and movement which is 
indicative of life.  The residual movement of a 
decapitated person or animal is described as a mere 
spasm and hence not indicative of life; the inference 
being that other forms of movement are indeed 
indicative that life is still present.15   
 
13 Rabbi Shlomo Yitzchaki (1040 –1105), was a medieval French rabbi and author of a 
comprehensive commentary on the Bible and Talmud.  See JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY, 
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/rabbi-shlomo-yitzchaki-rashi (last visited Mar. 20, 
2020). 
14 Mishna Ohalot 1:6. 
15 Id.  
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In his view, the Mishna needed to identify the status of pirkus 
as an exception so as to affirm the underlying presumption that bodily 
movement is indicative of life.   
Rabbi Bleich utilizes his distinction between vital and non-vital 
motion to explain Rashi’s commentary on the passage in BT Yoma 
85a.  The passage in Yoma is as follows:   
The Rabbis taught: [If, on Shabbat, a person is buried 
under rubble,] until what point does one check [to 
clarify whether the victim is still alive?  They said: One 
clears] until [the victim’s] nose.  And some say: [One 
clears] until [the victim’s] heart…Rav Pappa said: The 
dispute [with regard to how far to clear the rubble to 
check for signs of life applies when the digger begins 
removing the rubble] from below [starting with the feet] 
to above.  But [if one cleared the rubble] from above to 
below, once he checked as far as [the victim’s] nose he 
is not required [to dig further,] as it is written: “All in 
whose nostrils was the breath of the spirit of life” 
(Genesis 7:22).16   
Rashi comments, clarifying the question, “until what point does 
one check [to clarify whether the victim is still alive?],” as follows: “if 
the person resembles a dead person in that he does not move his limbs.”  
Rashi is providing a visual depiction of the scene.  If the person is lying 
motionless, he may still be alive, and one should check in order to see 
if one can still save him or not.  Rabbi Bleich, however, formalizes the 
explanation to support his distinction between vital and non-vital 
movement.  He writes:  
Thus, there arises a need for a distinction between 
motion which is a veridical criterion of life and mere 
pirkus, or convulsive movement, which is not a sign of 
vital animation.  Accordingly, Rashi comments that 
other criteria of death assume significance only if the 
victim or patient appears to be dead as evidenced by the 
fact that ‘he does not move his limbs’ because, in the 
case of a person who has not been decapitated, bodily 
movement, in and of itself, is an absolute sign of 
vitality.17   
 
16 BT Yoma 85a.   
17 3 J. DAVID BLEICH, CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC PROBLEMS, 182 (1989). 
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Rabbi Bleich’s reading of Mishna Ohalot serves a justificatory 




III. HALAKHIC SOURCES THAT QUESTION WHETHER PIRKUS IS A 
NOVEL HALAKHIC CONCEPT  
As seen above, according to Rabbi Bleich, “pirkus” as non-
vital or convulsive movement connotes movement of a body part that 
has been separated from the body, implying that all bodily movement 
by a person whose body is still intact indicates “an absolute sign of 
vitality.”18  However, the Talmudic and halakhic literature does not 
always seem to support this view.  There are instances in the Talmud, 
where a person or animal displays bodily movement, yet is nonetheless 
declared as dead.  There are also instances where the Talmud 
specifically uses the word “pirkus” yet the Talmudic discussion 
concludes that the person or animal is still very much alive.  Given 
these examples, “pirkus” should not necessarily be viewed as a strict 
halakhic category.  Rather, the term may be seen simply as describing 
convulsive movement, which is then deemed either indicative of 
continued life or mere spasmatic movement depending on context.   
A. Examples Where Bodily Movement Is Not An 
Absolute Sign Of Vitality 
In the passage in BT Hullin 21a, the sages attempt to determine 
when to establish that a given person or animal begins to impart ritual 
impurity, which arises contemporaneously with the person’s or 
animal’s death.19  These cases challenge the clear boundary lines 
between life and death, since they are cases where the person or animal 
imparts ritual impurity even when they show signs, i.e. movement, that 
may seem to indicate life.  The passage reads as follows: 
Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani says [that] Rabbi Yohanan 
says: If one ripped [a person] like [one cuts] a fish, 
 
18 Id.  
19 BT Hullin 21a.  The comparisons between humans and animals in these discussions 
demonstrate that even while the Jewish tradition maintains that humans are qualitatively 
different than animals, death for both humans and animals occurs in the same ways. 
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[lengthwise, he] imparts impurity in a tent.  Rabbi 
Shmuel bar Yitzhak says: And [that is specifically if he 
was ripped] from his back.  Shmuel says: If one 
rendered [the animal like] a shard [gistera] [by cutting 
it in two widthwise, its halakhic status is that of] an 
unslaughtered carcass [nevelah].  Rabbi Elazar says: If 
the thigh [the hind leg of the animal] was removed and 
its recess is obvious, it is an unslaughtered carcass 
[nevelah].  What are the circumstances of its recess 
being obvious?  Rava said: [It is] any [situation] where 
[the animal] is collapsed [and even so its hind leg] is 
visibly lacking.20 
Rashi comments on the phrase, “imparts impurity in a tent,” 
that this is the case, even if the person is still moving (mefarkes).21  In 
this example, though the person’s back has been severed lengthwise, 
his body remains intact.  According to Rabbi Bleich’s understanding 
of Rashi’s comment from Ohalot, the person’s movement should be “a 
veridical criterion of life” and not “mere pirkus.”  However, Rashi 
explicitly uses the term “pirkus” to explain the intact body’s 
convulsions after the person has been declared dead.  Similarly, 
Maimonides rules, “If [a person’s] backbone is broken together with 
most of the surrounding flesh, he was torn apart like a fish from his 
back, he was decapitated, or he was cut in half from his stomach, he 
imparts impurity, even though some of his limbs are still making 
convulsive movements (merafref b’echad m’eivaraiv).”22  Rabbi 
Yaakov ben Asher23 in the Tur, Rabbi Yosef Karo, and Rabbi Yechiel 
Michel Epstein24 seem to understand Maimonides and the Talmudic 
passage in the same way, since they all write with respect to a person 
who suffers one of these fatalities, “even though he is still alive, he is 
considered as if dead.”25  It cannot be the case that these rabbis are 
proffering that one treat a person who is dying as if dead, since such a 
suggestion would contradict the general Talmudic principle to value 
 
20 Id. 
21 Rashi, BT Hullin 21a, s.v. “metameh b’ohel.” 
22 Hilkhot Tumat Met 1:15. 
https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/1517151/jewish/Tumat-Met-Chapter-1.htm  
23 Rabbi Yaakov ben Asher (1269-1343) was a well-known rabbi in the Holy Roman 
Empire and Spain. 
24 Rabbi Yechiel Michel ha-Levi Epstein (1829-1908) was a rabbi in Lithuania. 
25 Tur/Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh Deah 370; Arukh Hashulhan, Yoreh Deah 370:1.   
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life, no matter how much a person has left.  It would also contradict 
the explicit Halakha, found in the Shulhan Arukh (written by Rabbi 
Yosef Karo), which states “one in a dying condition is considered a 
living being in all respects … And whosoever closes [the dying 
person’s] eyes before death [which may hasten death] is regarded as 
one who sheds blood.”26  One must, therefore, understand the meaning 
of the phrase, “‘even though he is still alive, he is considered as if 
dead,”‘ to mean that despite the fact that the person still shows 
indications of life, as demonstrated by his convulsions, these situations 
render a person to be deemed dead, and we should understand that any 
movement they make is not halakhically significant.  As such, in this 
case, bodily convulsions, i.e. pirkus, have a different connotation than 
the one in the Mishna in Ohalot.  In Ohalot, pirkus describes movement 
of a body part that was severed from the animal.  Here, pirkus describes 
movement of the person himself.  In both cases, movement is deemed 
not to be determinative of life, but it is not the pirkus itself – as opposed 
to other “vital” motion – that establishes the ruling.  Rather, it is how 
the movement is understood within the greater context of the situation. 
With respect to conceiving of “pirkus” as a halakhic category, 
Maimonides’ ruling is interesting in two respects.  First, his ruling does 
not differentiate between bodily movements of a limb that has been 
separated from the body or bodily movements of a corpse that is intact.  
In all of these cases, bodily movement is not considered halakhically 
significant to indicate continued life.  Second, if “pirkus,” as non-vital 
movement, were an established legal category, the term should be used 
consistently so as to make explicit the legal ramifications in the event 
that it occurs.  However, Maimonides does not use the term, “pirkus,” 
to describe the person’s bodily movements in this situation, even 
though Rashi does.  Rather, he uses the term “merafref.”27  In the 
Talmudic literature, the term “merafref” is not found with reference to 
human convulsive movements.  The term refers to the fluttering of a 
bird’s wings,28 or the ripples on the surface of milk on a plate.29  With 
respect to the fluttering of a bird’s wings, the Talmud explicitly likens 
it to pirkus.30  It therefore does have the connotation of convulsive 
 
26 Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah 339:1. 
27 The term “merafref” is related to the term “yerofafu” in Job 26:11 (“The pillars of heaven 
tremble [yerofafu] and are astonished at His rebuke.”). 
28 Bereshit Rabbah 2:4. 
29 Bereshit Rabbah 4:8. 
30 BT Hullin 38b. 
8
Touro Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 1 [2020], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol36/iss1/4
2020 IS “VITAL MOTION” A HALAKHIC CONCEPT? 11 
movement, but it does not mean that these terms are formal legal 
concepts.  It is more likely that they are synonyms that describe similar 
types of movements, though one may be more appropriate to use in 
one situation over another.   
The term “mefarper” rather than “merafref,” on the other hand, 
is oftentimes used in the Talmud to refer to human convulsions that are 
indicative of life at the moment but that death is inevitable and 
imminent.  Examples include the following:  
“…The father of the boy[, i.e., the young priest who 
was stabbed,] came and found that he was convulsing 
(mefarper).  He said: May [my son’s death] be an 
atonement for you.  But my son is still convulsing 
(mefarper) [and has not yet died.  Therefore,] the knife[, 
which is in his body,] has not become ritually impure 
[through contact with a corpse]….”31   
“The Sages taught, [regarding the verse ‘If one be found 
slain in the land which Hashem your God has given you 
to possess it, lying in the field’ (Deuteronomy 21:1): 
‘Slain’ (hallal) [indicating one killed by a sword,] but 
not one who was strangled (hanuk); ‘slain,’ (hallal) but 
not [one who was found still] convulsing (mefarper).”32   
“The Sages taught…: How does the court describe 
testimony based on conjecture? The court says to the 
witnesses: ‘Perhaps you saw this man about whom you 
are testifying pursuing another into a ruin, and you 
pursued him and found a sword in his hand, dripping 
with blood, and the one who was ultimately killed was 
convulsing (mefarper).  If you saw only this, it is as if 
you saw nothing, and you cannot testify to the murder,’ 
since your testimony is conjecture.”33  
Maimonides uses the term “mefarper” to connote just these 
situations where death is inevitable and imminent, but the person is 
still alive.34  As such, Maimonides’ use of the term “merafref” in the 
 
31 BT Yoma 23a. https://www.sefaria.org/Yoma.23a?lang=bi  
32 BT Sotah 45b. https://www.sefaria.org/Sotah.45b?lang=bi  
33 Sanhedrin 37b; Shevuot 34a. 
34 See Hilkhot Rotzeah u’ Shmirat Nefesh 3:9, “Similarly, a person is liable for execution 
… [if] he held his hand over a colleague’s mouth and nose until he left him [convulsing] 
(mefarper), unable to live…the person who caused the victim’s death is executed; it is as if he 
had strangled him by hand.”  See id. at 9:11, “[Deuteronomy 21:1 states:] ‘[w]hen a corpse 
9
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particular instance of the Halakha above may be a scribal error, in 
which case one can assume the proper word should be “mefarper.”  
Though, if this were true, then “mefarper” would not exclusively imply 
that the person convulsing is still alive at the moment, which runs 
contrary to the use of the term in the Talmud.  Alternatively, 
Maimonides may have intentionally chosen “merafref” instead of 
“mefarper” to imply that the movements in the Halakha above are 
seemingly indicative of life, yet are not absolute signs of vitality.  
Rather, in the instance where a person’s backbone is broken together 
with most of the surrounding flesh or he was torn apart like a fish from 
his back, bodily movement should be seen in the same way as it is in a 
case of decapitation, which is also included in Maimonides’ list, i.e. as 
not halakhically relevant.  This does not make “merafref” a specific 
legal category for Maimonides, just as “pirkus” is not a specific legal 
category for him.  Both terms, whether they indicate movements of a 
body part that is separated from the whole or movement of the whole 
body itself, are simply synonyms for spasmatic movement, whose 
halakhic implications should be interpreted in light of the context of 
the situation.     
The following is an example where pirkus is used to describe 
bodily movement of humans, which may support Rabbi Bleich’s 
understanding of “pirkus” as non-vital movement, yet it is not 
necessary that it does so.  The Talmud notes that once a child is born, 
he inherits property from his mother if she dies.  This statement implies 
that a fetus does not inherit property.  The reason that a fetus does not 
inherit property is because it is presumed that a fetus will die in utero 
before the mother dies, and a deceased son does not inherit property 
from his mother or anyone else for that matter.  The Talmud then 
questions the presumption that a fetus will die in utero before the 
mother dies by citing an incident where a woman died and then the 
fetus made three spasmodic movements (pirkusi).  Regarding these 
movements, the Talmud cites Mar bar Rav Ashi, who states, “[j]ust as 
 
(hallal) is found…’ Hallal, [the term used for corpse indicates a person slain with a sword,] 
and not strangled to death, nor a person convulsing (mefarper); these are not implied by the 
term hallal.”  See also Hilkhot Sanherin 20:1, “A court does not inflict punishment on the 
basis of conclusions which it draws, only on the basis of the testimony of witnesses with clear 
proof.  Even if witnesses saw a person pursuing a colleague, they gave him a warning, but then 
diverted their attention, punishment is not inflicted on the basis of their testimony.  Or the 
followed the pursuer into a ruin, and they found the victim slain, yet in convulsing (mefarper), 
and the sword dripping blood in the hand of the killer, since they did not see him strike him, 
the court does not execute the killer based on this testimony.”  Concerning this and the like, 
Exodus 23:7 states: “Do not kill an innocent and righteous person.” 
10
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with the tail of the lizard, which convulses (she’mefarkeset) [and the 
movements do not indicate life for the tail, so with the movements of 
the fetus.]”35  However, it may be that Mar bar Rav Ashi was not 
disregarding the convulsions of the fetus because he conceived of 
pirkus as a halakhic category per se.  Rather, he could have been 
dismissing the particular pirkus of the fetus as being similar to the 
particular pirkus of the lizard’s separated tail.  In both instances, the 
movement would be significant, were it not for other factors.  For the 
lizard’s tail, the factor is that it is no longer connected to a living 
animal.  For the fetus, the factor is that it cannot live independently 
without the support of its mother until it is (about to be) born.  This 
analysis is in line with the position that the fetus is halakhically 
considered to be a like the thigh of the mother,36 which in this example 
are both still attached. 
B. Examples Where “Pirkus” Is A Sign Of Vitality 
In addition to the existence of Talmudic passages where bodily 
movement, according to Rabbi Bleich’s understanding, should be seen 
as a sign of vitality but nevertheless is not, there are also Talmudic 
passages where the presence of “pirkus” does indicate that the animal 
or person is still alive.  For example, with respect to pirkus of animals, 
the Mishna relates, “one who slaughters an impure animal for a gentile 
and it is still twitching (mefarkeset), it can render impure with the 
impurity of foods (tumat okhlin),37 but not with the impurity of 
carcasses (tumat nevelah) until it dies or until its head is chopped 
off.”38  The reason why it can render impure with the impurity of foods 
(tumat okhlin) but does not have the status of nevelah is due to the 
different legal prohibitions for Jews and non-Jews regarding eating 
animals.  At the moment of slaughter, the animal may not be eaten by 
the Jew because it is not a kosher animal.  For Jews, however, ritual 
slaughter deems an animal to be dead, so that it may be eaten even if a 
Jew is religiously prohibited to do so for kashrut reasons (i.e. 
considered as food).  For a non-Jew, the animal is prohibited because 
it is still considered alive, and non-Jews are prohibited to eat live 
 
35 BT Bava Batra 142b. 
36   BT Hullin 58a. 
37 Tumat Okhlin are contracted by food items that become ritually defiled by contact with a 
dead body and can then defile other food and drink.   
38 Mishna Taharot 1:4. 
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animals according to Noahide law.  In this example, pirkus is 
halakhically significant as an indication that the animal is still alive, 
albeit for the purpose of non-Jews’ observance of Noahide law.  Based 
on this, “pirkus” would not connote a legal category of “non-vital” 
motion, since the movement is an indication that the animal is deemed 
alive, at least according to Noahide law even if not according to 
Halakha. 
With respect to pirkus of fowl, the Talmud gives the following 
ruling: If one trampled fowl with his foot, or threw it against a wall, or 
if an animal crushed it, and it is convulsing (mefarkeset); if the animal 
[remained alive] from the time of the injury until twenty-four hours 
later, and a person then slaughtered it, it is kosher [provided no other 
defect is found that would have caused it to die within twelve months, 
which would render it a treifa].  Rabbi Elazar bar Yannai said in the 
name of Rabbi Elazar ben Antigonus, “It requires examination [after 
slaughtering, to make sure it does not have a defect that would render 
it treifa]”.39  Maimonides rules according to the anonymous 
statement,40 and Rabbi Karo rule according to Rabbi Elazar ben 
Antigonus.41  Yet, according to both Maimonides and Rabbi Karo, the 
animals movements are not simply relegated as halakhically irrelevant.  
Rather, in this instance, the fowl’s movement is an indication that it is 
still very much alive, since the fowl may be slaughtered afterwards. 
With respect to interpreting pirkus as a sign of vitality for 
people, the Talmud states, “Why is it taught in a baraita: If one 
unintentionally cut the two passageways of another person, or most of 
the thickness of the two, he is not exiled?  [The wound is definitely 
fatal.  Therefore, one who unintentionally wounds another in this 
manner should be exiled.  The Talmud answers: With regard to that 
baraita,] Rav Hoshaya said: We are concerned that perhaps the wind 
aggravated his condition and actually caused his death, in which case 
the perpetrator is not culpable for the death and should not be exiled.  
Alternatively, perhaps [the victim] hastened his own death.”42  The 
Talmudic discussion concludes by saying that the practical difference 
 
39 BT Betzah 34a.  See also BT Hullin 56a. 
40 See Hilkhot Shechitah 9:20. Maimonides rules according to the anonymous statement 
because it is an explicit Mishna. 
41 Yoreh Deah 58:2. See also HALAKHAH. BACH. YOREH DEAH, SIMAN 58:2, 
https://www.sefaria.org/Bach%2C_Yoreh_Deah.58.2.1?lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en. 
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between the two possibilities is either where someone cuts the victim’s 
trachea and esophagus in a house of marble, which was closed on every 
side so that there was no wind, and the victim convulsed (v’parkeis).  
In this situation, the person’s convulsions (pirkus) might have hastened 
his own death.   On the other hand, in a case where someone cuts the 
victim’s trachea and esophagus outside where there is wind, and the 
victim did not convulse at all (v’lo parkeis), the wind may be seen as a 
contributing factor to the person’s death.  According to the reasoning 
of the Talmudic discussion, convulsion (pirkus) is interpreted to 
indicate that he person is still alive, for only then can the movement in 
fact contribute to the person’s death.43  In fact, Maimonides rules, 
“Even if the killer severed the victim’s windpipe and esophagus, if the 
victim remained alive for a short while, the killer is not exiled on his 
accord. Therefore, it is only when the victim died without pirkus at all, 
or was killed in a place that was not open to the wind - e.g., a closed 
marble building, or the like - that the killer is exiled.”44  Based on this 
Talmudic passage and Maimonides’ ruling, pirkus in this case is an 
indication that the person is still alive.  It is not used as a halakhic 
category which connotes non-vital movement. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this article is not to dismiss the position that 
cardiac activity and vital motion is a definitive signifier that a person 
is still alive.  We recognize that the debate this topic engenders has 
become a disagreement for the sake of Heaven (machloket l’shem 
Shamayim),45 and the respective positions should be seen as words of 
the Living God (divrei Elokim hayyim),46 even if one position may 
eventually become the main normative ruling in the future.47  Nor have 
the authors of this article sought to appraise the concept of vital motion 
from a scientific or philosophical viewpoint.  Rather, the authors’ 
 
43 BT Yevamot 121a.  See also TALMUD. YEVAMOT DAF 121a. THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON 
TALMUD, https://www.sefaria.org/Yevamot.121a.1-2?lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en. 
44 Hilkhot Rotzeach uShmirat Nefesh 5:2.  See also ROTZEACH USHMIRAT NEFESH - CHAPTER 
FIVE. (Trans. by Eliyahu Touger), 
https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/1088921/jewish/Rotzeach-uShmirat-Nefesh-
Chapter-Five.htm. 
45 Mishna Avot 5:17. 
46 BT Eruvin 13b. 
47 Id.; see also BT Berakhot 36b, (which states, “u’Bet Shammai b’makom Bet Hillel, eino 
mishna.”). 
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objective was to evaluate the assumption that the halakhic concept of 
vital motion can be inferred from the existence of a halakhic category 
of non-vital motion, i.e. pirkus.  Through our analysis of the relevant 
authoritative sources of Jewish law, we believe that we have shown 
that pirkus is not a distinct or exclusive halakhic category.  Rather, 
physical or physiological activity is understood in context as either 
meaningful or not.  This finding challenges the assumption that one 
can infer the concept of “vital motion” from the concept of “pirkus.”  
The concept of “vital motion” must therefore find different legal 
support upon which it can rely for juridical justification. 
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